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Abstract 
This article explores issues around security sector reform (SSR) and the involvement of the 
international community in peacebuilding. It argues that the international architecture that 
surrounds SSR privileges a particular form of knowledge that reflects a technocratic approach to 
security, and illustrates this by systematically examining the literature. Research in to the literature 
itself shows that there are three core themes that dominate: state-centric approaches; technocratic 
approaches and approaches to local ownership. These comprise a current, linear approach to SSR 
that ignores much of the critical literature on peacebuilding. The article then goes on to draw on 
some of this critical literature to develop an alternative approach to SSR building on a non-linear 
approach incorporating a better understanding of institutional politics, an emphasis on process 
rather than structures and analysis of hidden politics. 
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Introduction 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) has become an integral element of international intervention in war-
torn countries for some years, evolving in to a common, and yet contested, form of post-conflict 
state-building (Hängi, 2004; Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014,132). Initially concentrating on a narrow 
set of security actors, usually military and police, SSR attempts to address issues of citizen and state 
security through establishing effective civil and/or civilian control over professional security services, 
whilst at the same time incorporating state and non-state actors in to the security assemblage. SSR 
literature reflects a long-term change from a focus on narrow, technical approaches and concepts 
through to far wider concerns encapsulating traditional justice, gender and the nature of justice 
(Bakrania, 2015). SSR practice recognises that security is necessary for the development of 
sustainable peace and it therefore constructs effective, affordable and efficient security forces that 
are subject to the rule of law and democratic control (Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014; Andersen, 
2011; Schnabel and Born, 2011). Many of these developments have come about as a result of 
feedback from experience on the ground rather than through conceptual development, resulting in 
a situation in which SSR has suffered from ‘benign analytical neglect’ (Peake, Scheye and Hills, 2013, 
vii). 
Despite the absence of detailed conceptual development, SSR has been subject to considerable 
changes in focus, not least in starting from a basic assumption that security takes place within a 
traditional Weberian state framework and this must, therefore, be the appropriate way in which to 
measure the success or otherwise of any given mission (Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014, 143). Critical 
approaches have questioned this, pointing out that there are many competing sources of security 
that may exist beyond the state, particularly at the local level and that these remain poorly 
understood (Jackson, 2011). Secondly, this acknowledgement of complex webs of security providers 
and local sources of security and insecurity recognises the importance of non-linear approaches to 
security provision, including hybrid forms of security organisation (Chandler, 2013). Lastly, since SSR 
has emerged as an important security approach there has been an increasing debate around 
concepts of local ownership, specifically who designs, controls and benefits from SSR interventions. 
Answers to these questions range from an approach that amounts to international trusteeship and 
leadership through to complete local control of security (Mobekk, 2010). 
All contemporary approaches are encompassed by assumptions about the nature of the state, 
specifically that particular forms of the state are preferable as outcomes of statebuilding efforts, and 
that SSR and statebuilding agendas do not just aim at reconstructing security institutions but at 
social engineering through remoulding socio-political institutional structures. This drives medical-
themed approaches that assume interventions to ‘correct’ failed states can make them functioning 
members of an international network of liberal states leading to security. This challenge has driven 
discussion amongst those directly involved in SSR programming itself, usually concentrating on the 
incorporation of ‘non-state actors’ (Denney and Domingo, 2015). This article contends that the non-
linearity of ‘hybrid’, ‘post-liberal’ and ‘everyday’ forms of peacebuilding that set out to criticise 
liberal statebuilding more broadly, provide a vibrant critique of hegemonic practices of international 
statebuilding and also a way forward in to a ‘second generation’ approach encompassing political 
realities and empirical reality. 
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This article is based on the most comprehensive mapping of SSR literature to date, aimed at 
identifying what we know and don’t know about SSR. It then develops an approach partly deriving 
from what is missing or undeveloped within the literature. The research was carried out between 
July and September 2015 by the Governance and Social Development Resource centre for the UK’s 
Department for International Development (Bakrania, 2015)iii. This ‘evidence mapping’ exercise was 
designed to survey the existing knowledge about security and justice, and to identify topics where 
evidence is abundant or scarce. Systematic searches generated 126,276 studies on security and 
justice which were added to an earlier evidence mapping on SSR, which generated 85,269 studies. 
The two databases were then combined, and an inclusion criterion following a study protocol, was 
applied. This resulted in a total of 386 documents in the database (Bakrania, 2015). This exercise 
provides the first detailed and systematic insight into the current literature available on SSR and 
security and justice interventions more widely and provides an excellent picture of the pattern of 
existing knowledge. It shows that the international community continues to advocate (and research) 
linear models of statebuilding based on formal security structures, but without building knowledge 
around accountability of those institutions, or, despite discussing it, continuing in failing to 
understand the relationships between security actors. This leads to representation of complex 
networks of relationships as simple state/non-state or international/local dichotomies without 
acknowledging the inter-relationships of the systems or of boundary-crossing individuals. 
This article starts with what we know about security and justice planning and SSR. It discusses the 
linear nature of this approach and how a non-linear approach may be incorporated, finishing with a 
discussion of the potential value of the non-linear approach for the future of SSR. Linear approaches 
tend to focus on Western liberal statebuilding models as reflected in the literature on SSR, which 
concentrates on the easier (and the easier-to-measure) aspects. Non-linear approaches advocate 
hybridity, local processes and the everyday, partly as an expression of ‘hidden’ resistance to 
international hegemony, but at the same time they also tend to reify those outcomes and to 
perpetuate a false dichotomy of choice facing citizens who are seeking security. If linear approaches 
make a set of assumptions that are unclear and haven’t worked, how might non-linear approaches 
be incorporated in to a new, second generation approach to SSR that can overcome this? 
What do we know about SSR? 
SSR is a relatively recent phenomenon but is rooted in earlier debates about civil-military relations 
(Jackson, 2011). It is perhaps different to a number of contemporary academic debates within 
peacebuilding because it combines an explicitly normative agenda of linking liberal statebuilding 
with human security. The concept has been driven, at least early in its development, by policy-
makers on the ground rather than through analytical depth or an explicit theoretical framework and 
research has tended to follow policy within SSR. Early development of SSR was driven by the 
democratisation of Eastern Europe, then South Africa, both of which involved transformation from 
autocratic or non-democratic regimes to western democracy. The 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-
Military Aspects of Security, adopted by the OSCE, required member states to accept democratic 
control over military and other security forces, a set of principles that were then taken on as 
‘security sector reform’ by the United Kingdom and then by the Development Assistance Committee 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation (OECD-DAC), chaired at the time by the UK. Since 
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then, SSR has developed rapidly within all major multilateral organisations and is now a common 
element of policy towards post-conflict interventions and approaches towards failed states. 
Despite this rapid rise to prominence, SSR has never overcome the issue identified by Brzoska that a 
comprehensive approach to SSR has been ‘sound in theory but problematic in practice’ (2006, 2). 
The history of SSR has been one where theory has also been rather unsound, with very few 
comprehensive studies on the theory behind SSR or its underlying assumptions (Jackson, 2011). In 
practice the picture is no more encouraging with very few examples of successful SSR, and a singular 
inability to overcome an issue identified by Chanaa as a ‘conceptual-contextual divide’ (2002, 16)). A 
decade later, Sedra noted that ‘this divide had become a chasm’ (Sedra, 2013, 212). As Schroeder 
and Chappuis (2014, 136) note, most writing on SSR focusses on individual cases, and within that, 
the implementation of existing policies rather than on alternatives or on questioning underlying 
assumptions. Furthermore, SSR remains under-politicised, lacks understanding of local dynamics and 
have been decoupled from debates on statebuilding or liberal peacebuilding more generally 
(Jackson, 2011; Peake, Scheye and Hills, 2013; Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014). 
The evidence base on which to make claims about SSR literature remains weak. The starting point 
for the research underpinning this article was therefore what do we actually know about SSR? The 
database combines studies generated through two distinct, but related, evidence mapping 
processes, one related to SSR, and the other expanded upon this to broaden the scope to S&J. Both 
of these began with systematic searches within academic and grey literature databases, which used 
keyword combinations to identify studies containing evidence on interventions. The final 386 
documents all provide evidence on interventions. Purely theoretical and conceptual studies were 
not included. The database illustrates elements of SSR and security and justice interventions more 
broadly. 95 per cent of the studies used observational research designs and only eight studies used 
experimental methods (see Barendrecht et al, 2013). However, within the qualitative work, there 
was a wide mixture of methods incorporating ethnography, case study analysis, historiography and 
political economy analysis. There were also fifteen non-systematic literature reviews and annotated 
bibliographies (Cox, 2008; Maru, 2010). 49 per cent of the documents are peer reviewed articles, 35 
per cent are ‘other’ reports, including think tank and NGO reports (DCAF, USIP, Saferworld, 
International Alert), and only 6 per cent are formal evaluation reports. There are also many more 
single case studies than multi-country comparative studies.  
The geographical spread of the SSR documentation shows clearly that Africa dominates, with South 
Asia well behind. There are few studies that look at Central Asia, East Asia, Eastern Europe and 
Northern Africa. The most studied country is Sierra Leone, but Afghanistan is the second most 
studied, followed by Liberia, Timor Leste and Bosnia Herzegovina. Note that the time criterion used 
will also have influenced which countries were being studied. Policing is by far the most studied 
area, followed by access to justice, justice sector reform, legal reform and defence. Few studies look 
at intelligence and even less at border security, even those addressing more than one theme. 
Emerging policy themesiv of urbanisation, counter-terrorism and organised crime are almost absent 
from the document base.  
The evidence mapping exercise was designed around a framework of interventions and outputs and 
outcomes, which themselves were based on DFID’s SSR ‘theory of change’v. There is considerable 
evidence around capacity building within organisations, particularly government institutions; 
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strategic or statutory frameworks; community based approaches; and restructuring of the security 
and justice sector. In other words, the literature tends to reflect the elements that have happened 
on the ground in international approaches to SSR and statebuilding (Jackson, 2011). This is 
unsurprising, however it does reflect a tendency for researchers to mirror approaches taken by 
those who are running programmes in ‘measuring what can be measured’, rather than researching 
more complex areas. Studies in the database reflect state-centric approaches because they all focus 
on interventions, and most interventions to date follow traditional approaches to SSR. It is perhaps 
unsurprising that researchers or evaluators for producing studies that reflect traditional approaches 
because examples of new and more politically sensitive approaches are scarce. This is reflected in a 
dearth of evidence on the nature of preventive interventions like combating urbanised violence and 
organised crime; non-state justice and capacity building; and integrated political engagement and 
activities that deal directly with the politics of SSR reform. The issue of politics and SSR has long been 
identified within the security literature, but despite its constant feature as an ‘issue’ it has rarely 
been directly confronted other than as an explanation of why interventions failed. 
Evidence is strong across a series of outputs that reflect the nature of interventions in state-
dominated institutions. There is considerable evidence regarding accountability of institutions in 
terms of politicisation, political interference and independence of professions like the military, police 
and judiciary. ‘Accountability’ also features strongly in analyses of community approaches of 
institutions for the general population, but also in relation to capacity building and training. In 
general the literature on service delivery and capacity was strong particularly in terms of formal 
performance review, leadership and management systems. This is also reflected in work on the 
formal aspects of planning, including security plans and strategic frameworks; confidence, trust and 
satisfaction in service provision; and, roles, coordination and dialogue. However, these latter 
categories were primarily constructed around anecdotal evidence.  
The emphasis on formal structures and institutions is further highlighted when one analyses those 
areas where there is a lack of evidence. There is a lack of evidence about the nature of the roles that 
appear in formal documentation but may not be functional on the ground. Evidence is lacking 
regarding the application, compliance and interpretation of laws. Whilst a plan, structure or law may 
exist on paper, there is very little systematic evidence showing whether it reflects the empirical 
situation, and evidence that does exist is largely anecdotal and subjective. Knowledge about state 
and non-state linkages is inadequate: both the extent to which codification is possible between state 
and non-state systems; but also about how far state and non-state providers of security may be 
linked. Lastly, there is some evidence around political outcomes and political will, but this really 
reflects opinion rather than systematic evidence. This bias favouring opinion over empirical evidence 
is reflected in the related areas of resource allocation to reform processes, but also in the growing 
policy literature on local ownership, where several documents equate local ownership to those who 
agree with the reform rather than those who act as ‘spoilers’. Again, there is also significant 
evidence surrounding human rights, but this mirrors earlier SSR approaches that emphasised formal 
rules and regulations, since much of the extant literature examines measurable indicators like 
legislation, rather than actual implementation.  
Areas of SSR identified as having specific weaknesses included: incentives to improve service 
delivery; crime rates which are frequently difficult to verify; data on legal awareness and choice; 
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gender-based violence; judicial redress in support for rights; economic development; poverty 
reduction; property rights, particularly access to land, which has been identified as a conflict trigger 
but appears absent in many analyses of SSR interventions despite its prevalence as a type of court 
case within both formal and informal justice systems; and, women’s empowerment and gender 
equality. 
The existing evidence for SSR is mixed and in many ways reflects issues identified within policy 
approaches to SSR (Denney and Domingo, 2015). In particular, the research on interventions 
unsurprisingly reflects an overarching picture of concentration on the measurable over the 
intangible, the formal institutional reform and documentation over the more intangible, the 
politically difficult and the more complex interlinkages that are far more difficult to fit in to 
measureable boxesvi. It is not accidental that the highest concentration of studies are in West Africa, 
particularly Sierra Leone, since this has been well documented and also involved considerable 
institution building (Jackson and Albrecht, 2010, 2016). The same may be true of Afghanistan and 
Bosnia. However, even in these well-trodden areas there remain considerable gaps in dealing with 
areas beyond the safer boundaries of the formal institutional reform process, incorporating issues 
with traditional authorities, non-state security actors and their political linkages. The literature 
acknowledges some of the more complex issues whilst rarely providing explanations of how these 
may be overcome or why they exist. In fact, the literature is curiously non-theoretical, generally 
confirming Schroeder and Chappuis (2014) finding that the growth in case studies has taken place 
within existing policy approaches rather than developing new theoretical frameworks within which 
SSR can develop. Whilst the database did not include many specifically theoretical contributions, the 
lack of a backward linkage from the intervention to a theoretical framework is noticeable. 
Additionally, evidence on a complex understanding of local societies and political environments 
within which SSR is being implemented is missing, most cases concentrating on causes of previous 
conflicts and neglecting critical political factors that may have a direct bearing on reform processes. 
Chanaa’s (2002) ‘conceptual-contextual divide’ has been deepened by an approach that exhibits lack 
of consistency between normative concepts and real field situations.  
Current dilemmas within SSR approaches 
This section moves on from knowledge about SSR and outlines four key challenges or dilemmas for 
SSR. Following from the analysis, it is clear that there are inconsistencies between statebuilding, 
security and development. There is an (unwritten) assumption that human security can be best 
served by creating a functioning state that will provide security as a public good and that 
development will provide benefits to the general population. However, human security in terms of 
‘freedom from fear’ and citizen security in terms of an entitlement to protection by the state, 
remains elusive for many people and the state’s responsibility to protect citizens is yet to be 
realised. This lack, in turn, may lead to claims of legitimisation of international intervention in failed 
states (Luckham and Kirk, 2012).  
The transfer of the political architecture of the liberal state to non-liberal societies in the form of 
state-building, and by extension SSR, leads to a tension between the pacific nature of liberalism and 
the question whether those structures really are the political manifestation of the local populations 
(Jackson, 2011). There is a fundamental tension between the idea of local ownership of security and 
shared values underlying SSR. International donors are very keen to see states adopt transparency 
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and accountability, but those constituting the governing elite of a state may feel that their power is 
threatened and the citizenry may prefer to be safe than to have more transparency. As statebuilding 
has become a core policy for international actors, security has become central to the way in which 
Western Governments deal with the developing world. At the core of this is the general tendency 
across international aid interventions that privileges a particular form of normative approach. This 
appears both in terms of a preference for the international community to use the legitimacy of state 
structures, but also through the assumption that local actors have internalised the requisite norms 
of behaviour privileged by the international community itself (Pospisil and Kuhn, 2016, 9-10).  
The literature on SSR reflects a previous understanding of intervention which rests on the 
assumption that every person is a rational liberal waiting to be liberated (Duffield, 2001, 2002). 
What this has meant is that much programming aims at technical approaches that could undermine 
the positions of narrow self-interested elites and free the local agency of civil society. This is a linear 
approach that makes a series of assumptions about how reform works and how far that can be 
directly – and predictably – affected. Within this framing, local politics was frequently 
problematized, but in such a way as to be framed as what spoilers engage in to prevent the 
achievement of the wider – and accepted – goals of SSR. Obstacles could be overcome through a 
combination of what Chandler (2013,19) refers to as ‘top-down carrots and sticks’. Essentially, SSR 
was seen as a technical exercise aimed at enhancing human security, and political opposition as 
preventing the serene progress of something that was wanted by local populations. Beyond the 
elites within countries, local populations were depoliticised as programming emphasised the lack of 
capacity or resources as obstacles to reform progress. Linearity in the sense of predictable progress 
through programmes, assumed not only that ruling elites were not representative of their respective 
populations, but also that those populations had an interest in supporting Western interventions 
(Chandler, 2013). Successful reform was a question of political will, both on the part of those in the 
country in accepting inevitable reform but also on the part of Western donors, who provided the 
resources and expertise to enforce those interventions. The linear approach assumed progress took 
place down a set path towards liberal peace; the only things standing in the way were lack of 
resources, of capacity, of international will and local predatory elites. 
Linear approaches are subject to key sets of tensions, reflected in gaps within the literature and 
available evidence base: state-centrism; techno-centrism; and the nature of ownership.  
State-centrism 
One of the clearest characteristics of most SSR literature is the tension between state-centric SSR 
programmes and the social and political realities of fragmented polities on the ground within fragile 
states where policing, for example, may be delivered by an ‘archipelago of elements’ to use Copan’s 
memorable phrase, rather than a formal, centralised police service (Copans, 2001,11; Andersen, 
2011). Whilst virtually all analysts accept that there are problems with the nation state in many of 
the contexts in which states are failing, there is still a tendency to accept the technocratic 
parameters of statebuilding. Casting the nation-state as the norm ignores the broadening and 
deepening of security at all levels, the intra-state nature of much conflict, international conflict 
actors and also the role of the state itself as participant. There remains an assumption that the right 
mixture of policies can create a healthy nation-state.  
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State-centrism itself changes local power structures amongst those who benefit from training, 
equipment and resources. In situations where the state is one actor amongst many, this could 
effectively enhance just another armed faction. For a state to actually exist requires the population 
to buy in to the idea of the state at some level to provide legitimacy. In a liberal state this is 
commonly taken as participation in the political processes such as periodic democratic elections. 
However, formal legitimacy may not be achievable or even desirable for citizens. A technocratic 
approach may have the effect of creating a state super-structure with no legitimacy amongst the 
general population, but that provides avenues to power for local elites (Timor-Leste) or replaces a 
colonial authoritarianism with a post-colonial authoritarian state (Lemay-Hebert, 2009; 2011) . 
Constructing a new state also requires a significant cultural shift in how people relate to structures 
of authority, including both state and ‘customary’ authorities. Iraq is an example where the 
approach of dismantling the state in its entirety led to an artificial state overlaying existing 
subnational political systems dependant on external aid: Afghanistan is even clearer. The emphasis 
on security governance that makes SSR part of statebuilding has been lost in the drive to train and 
equip troops to fight the Taliban (Hodes and Sedra, 2013).  
Lastly, statebuilding is very uneven within states. Even where states have had a functioning core 
before, during or even after conflict, it may only rarely, or partially have penetrated into the 
countryside, notably in many African countries (Jackson, 2007). Many people simply do not receive 
or have ever received services directly from states. In the area of justice provision, for example, 
around eighty per cent of the population in Sierra Leone and Rwanda receive justice from customary 
authorities like chiefs or village headmen, and this is accompanied by local security in the form of 
chiefdom police, hunter militias or ‘vigilantes’ (Baker, 2008). At best, this can produce a political 
hybrid where local people both have a say and also have a choice in terms of accessing services, 
including security, but also encompassing a variety of plural providers (Denney, 2014). However, 
there is a risk that political hybridity also reinforces the position of local elites and neo-patrimonial 
rule. 
Techno-centrism 
Alongside the construction of institutions that are aligned to ideas of what a state looks like, the 
history of SSR programming and also literature has been greatly concerned with technical aspects of 
the reform process. Statebuilding and SSR literatures rarely provide a comprehensive theoretical 
framework for statebuilding and tend to concentrate on technocratic approaches to the 
construction of states rather than the politics of what is being constructed (see, for example, Denney 
and Domingo, 2014). There is a critical literature that points to the lack of focus on the political 
within statebuilding, but this has not been clearly reflected in policies on the ground in those states 
where SSR has been appliedvii. This decontextualized approach removes politics of reform to a place 
where it can be categorised as a ‘spoiler’ rather than something that is an integral part of the reform 
process. Many interventions are frequently carried out by international bureaucrats, or in SSR, by 
military officers whose concerns are primarily technical (i.e., teaching people to shoot straight) 
rather than political (i.e., teaching them who to shoot at).  
Technocratic approaches to SSR represent a form of anti-politics machinery both in terms of their 
disregard for local political sensitivities, but also in their relentless application and reapplication. As 
Richmond (2007, 111) points out, the contemporary peacebuilding consensus assumes that there is 
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an agreed underlying set of norms and that all interventions in support of this will receive the 
support of agents engaged in peacebuilding. A key element of this consensus is to create standards, 
benchmarks and frameworks for creating a pacific world that constitute a specific type of knowledge 
that can then be transferred to conflict zones as international norms. This knowledge is 
accompanied by a set of practices designated by technical terminology as ‘tools’, ‘indicators’, 
‘templates or ‘instruments’ that can be considered apolitical and objective ways to represent reality 
(Körppen, 2011, 81) 
Technical approaches and particularly approaches that seek the best technical solution to a problem 
according to best practice bring additional issues with them. Notably they tend to be resource-
hungry, making them expensive to implement, but also to sustain over the long-term. However, 
many technical programmes within SSR, are also measurable, making them attractive propositions 
for international programmes. Again, the available literature on SSR is biased towards the 
measurable outputs. Within SSR programmes what this tends to mean in practice is that core 
training programmes for the military and police, for example, are carried out, but the surrounding 
civil frameworks of control are relatively neglected (see Jackson and Albrecht, 2016). Externally 
funded and driven, interventions can be extremely expensive and reflect the concerns of the 
funders, even if local ownership is possible. It raises questions about long term sustainability of 
reform and security and also the relative balance between different activities. Changing definitions 
of insecurity show that this balance needs to adjust to these changes, but entrenched interests and 
the inflexibility of many donor planning systems mean that states may be locked in to set 
trajectories. 
Local Ownership 
SSR programming is inextricably entwined with statebuilding (Jackson, 2011). This matters for who 
owns this process and what choices those people may exercise in the unfolding of programming 
priorities. Whilst clearly SSR could privilege compliance with international state norms and rules, and 
this may be in line with the desires of some potential local owners, it raises the question of how local 
ownership can be exercised if these local owners do not want to comply with international norms? 
Local ownership may be contested and SSR tends to see local ownership as exercised by those who 
accept broad liberal state policies and structures. The use of customary power structures also 
facilitates the exercise of hidden transcripts of power that trap the dominant as well as the weak 
within the same web of socialised roles and behaviour (Scott, 1990). 
The literature is divided on the issue of local ownership. The core question relates to agency within 
the process but despite the standard use of the term, there is no consensus on either what it means, 
or how it can be enacted (Donais, 2008; Mobekk, 2010). As Schroeder and Chappuis (2014) point 
out, local ownership is either over-romanticised or seen as a problem to be overcome. This reflects a 
wariness about local ownership and local owners themselves. They may not be representative, they 
may not be willing to be inclusive and they may be an elite, but they may be the real owners and 
unwilling to relinquish control. International involvement in strengthening security institutions may 
cement the positions of ruling groups, and it may be naive to assume that such local owners would 
accept programmes designed to change or dilute their own power. Within the discussions 
surrounding local ownership there is also a an emphasis on the role of local security and justice 
institutions (Nathan, 2007; Baker, 2010).  
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This raises the issue of the nature of the international community. This article takes the view that 
‘…‘the international community’ is a distinguishable conglomerate of political actors and a rhetorical 
instrument open for use in political discourse for a wide variety of actors and means.’ (Bliesemann 
De Guevara and Kuhn, 2011, 136). At the same time, humanitarian space is hybrid—a site of 
contention between international agencies pursuing neoliberal orthodoxies of a putative global 
governance and local groups resisting these impositions. (Heathershaw, 2016, 28). The international 
community involvement also represents a discourse circulating in a knowledge economy where signs 
of success become more important than success itself, and where knowledge is socially constructed 
(Heathershaw, 2016; Bliesemann de Guevara & Kostić, 2017). In SSR, the international community is 
an extraordinarily broad church. At its core are state institutions, both local and international, 
including state donors, the military and the police. However, there are also significant contributions 
by international NGOs and organisations, the UN and other multilateral donors, and also those 
engaged in activities as diverse as human rights promotion and demining. Discussion of one, singular 
‘international community’ within SSR is problematic and this article uses this term as a loose 
reference to those with international agency who are broadly following established norms laid out 
by the UN and OECD/DAC. This incorporates the large number of very powerful aid agencies 
engaged in what is a very expensive set of activities, but perhaps not all. The relevance of this is that 
the overwhelming direction of SSR programming is determined by this unwieldy coalition which is 
difficult to stop. If SSR is to shift away from purely internationally-led approaches to more inclusive 
programmes, then the literature implies that we lack sufficient knowledge. The socially constructed 
knowledge of success identified by Bliesemann de Guevara and Kostić (2017), amongst others, 
means that we lack a socially constructed knowledge of failure within the literature. Specifically, 
there is an absence of empirically informed localised interventions that start with realistic political 
analysis (Mannitz, 2014). 
The overwhelming reaction to failures and shortcomings in SSR has been to develop new versions of 
existing technocratic solutions, increase funding or to improve communication, despite evidence of 
limited impact. A second generation SSR needs to move away from these linear approaches and 
reflect wider changes within the literature on statebuilding and peacebuilding, particularly ideas 
around hybridity and non-state actors (MacGinty and Richmond, 2013; Lemay-Hebert and 
Freedman, 2017). The practical approaches and categories deployed by the international community 
within SSR need to be coupled with a measure of humility in terms of the ambitious aims of some 
programming. This is coupled with a lack of knowledge of exactly how international interventions 
will affect already existing systems and how their implementation is likely to co-exist with those 
systems.  
If SSR is embarking on a second generation then the focus needs to change away from just building 
institutions, however important, and be redirected towards how the end users interact with the 
potential choices they face and what institutions are viable within those environments. Whilst much 
literature discusses ‘the local’, there is a clearly a limited understanding of what this looks and in 
what ways the politics of the local interact with the politics of the international. As Daniela Körppen 
states:  
‘This leads to a tautology, because liberal peace approaches only support local ownership if 
it adheres to the basic components of liberal peace and if it does not undermine liberal 
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values. According to this, they can hardly opt for participatory or meaningful local 
ownerships, as this could signify cultural conflict transformation practices which are not 
compatible with a liberal perspective.’ (2011, 83)  
What does non-linear SSR look like? 
It is clear from the extant literature on SSR that practitioners and researchers have recognised a 
central challenge in how to deal with the perceived failures of linear approaches (Denney and 
Domingo, 2014). Usually the debate is couched in terms of assimilating ‘non-state actors’ (Baker, 
2008; Mannitz, 2014). These debates are also linked to the development of ‘hybrid’ approaches 
within the peacebuilding literature (MacGinty and Richmond, 2013). This has led to more discussion 
and advocacy of a move beyond linear approaches to the state and towards recognition of the links 
between external and domestic actors (Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014; Lemay-Hebert and 
Freedman, 2017) and works that try to uncover the hidden discourses behind or in parallel with the 
dominant public transcripts of international peacebuilding interventions (Bliesemann de Guevara & 
Kostić, 2017). With concepts such as ‘everyday’, ‘hybrid’ and ‘post-liberal’ forms of peace (and 
statebuilding), critical peacebuilding scholars presented alternatives in light of the fundamental 
criticisms mounted against the adherents of liberal interventionism in both policy and academia. 
This has led to far greater emphasis on real accountability through the inclusion of people within SSR 
programming rather than just institutions, recognising the importance of politics. 
The linear understanding of SSR outlined above represents a view of liberal statebuilding that 
envisaged states being constructed where institutions supported the establishment of societal 
frameworks in which liberal individuals could flourish. Liberal peace was therefore an outcome of 
creating the liberal state, including security and justice institutions at its heart, and incorporating 
democratic control, rule of law and professionalization of bureaucracies (Lemay-Hebert, 2009). 
However, a non-linear approach requires a very different concept of the political from this top down 
set of assumptions. A non-linear approach recognises that externally imposed liberal structures sit 
on top of the real underlying politics of states and, rather than being neutral arbiters. Körppen and 
Ropers (2011), emphasise that concentrating on institutional reform within peacebuilding is really 
only dealing with part of the picture, and they go on advocate systematic approaches that recognise 
outcomes as emergent properties of systems as a whole. Bernshausen and Bonacker provide an 
excellent summary of the theoretical underpinnings of this approach: 
‘As opposed to actor-centric approaches, systemic approaches – and especially approaches 
founded on systems theory – direct considerable attention to the self-selectivity and self-
referentiality of conflict. [...] Thus, systemic approaches prefer to not look at conflict from 
the perspective of the actor but also incorporate the process perspective, which puts more 
emphasis on the momentum and dynamics of conflicts’ (2011, 24-25) 
This relates to ideas of hybrid systems, where recognising local-local and local-international politics 
raises the possibility of a hybrid system as an emergent property of political interaction between 
international programming and societal processes (MacGinty, 2010). Non-linear approaches 
therefore seek to work at the societal level, understanding the local politics of resistance and 
adaptation that has been neglected by top down linear approaches to SSR. 
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As Chandler (2013) rightly notes, this shift from linear to non-linear approaches partly has its roots 
within the peacebuilding work of Lederach and the development of a ‘process-orientated’ 
understanding whereby the role of external actors is not to impose institutions, but to assist in 
establishing a framework within which local societies can pursue their own peacebuilding processes 
(Lederach, 1997). This approach proposed that lessons be taken from quantum and chaos theory, 
particularly the idea that the system was more important than the individual elements. In 
peacebuilding, Lederach concluded that understanding politics did not incorporate institutions, 
leaders and parties, but societal spaces, practices and processes and: ‘The goal is not stasis, but 
rather the generation of continuous, dynamic, self-regenerating processes that maintain form over 
time and are able to adapt to environmental changes’ (Lederach, 1997, 84).  
This approach lends itself to further development with the work of Scott and the idea of ‘hidden’ 
politics of resistance beneath formal political processes (Scott, 1990). For Scott, the movements 
below the surface was what determined the support for visible political action. Again, the emphasis 
here is on the whole system, not just the visible elements, and the socially embedded relationships, 
networks and practices that formed what he terms ‘infrapolitics’ (Scott, 1990). Ideas of resistance 
and hidden politics have come to the fore in contemporary analyses of the lack of understanding of 
the Arab Spring, post-conflict Timor and others, but also in the politics of Eastern Europe where 
political scientists failed to predict the ‘velvet revolutions’ because they focussed on elite politics 
(Kaldor and Selchow, 2012; Richmond, 2009). Infrapolitics itself has, as Chandler (2013) identifies, 
shifted from an expression of avoidance and weakness, to an ontological starting point in explaining 
why linear peacebuilding models have failed.  
So what might infrapolitics look like within SSR? Our research shows that the literature reflects a 
strong the bias in programming towards measureable elements. Inputs to programmes feature 
strongly, and are frequently tentatively linked to outputs, although the causal mechanisms are not 
always well articulated. There is a great deal of material that references non-state actors, hybrid 
approaches and the role of customary authorities in providing security beyond the reach of 
institutions like police or military. Much of this literature takes the form of criticising linear 
approaches, without offering realistic alternatives, or tends to dichotomise the situation at the local 
level in to ‘formal/informal’, ‘international/local’ or ‘modern/customary or traditional’ and 
eventually, in its criticism of the international approaches ends up reifying the local (Chandler, 
2013). This approach tends to ignore the importance of linkages between these elements. The 
conceptual-contextual divide within theoretical approaches is projected on to a situation where the 
internationally supported state infrastructure is not linked to local political infrastructure, even if 
hidden political networks exist beneath the surface.  
So what does non-linear SSR look like? An emphasis on facilitating transformation through 
relinquishing control and following non-linear evolution – what Lederach refers to as the ‘crab like’ 
quality of transformation (Lederach 2005, 113) – has not been what the international donor 
community in particular, is willing to embrace. In many ways it is the opposite of the ‘measuring 
impact’ debate within most contemporary donors, which demands a theory of change, a set of 
desired outputs and a correlation between inputs and their eventual impact. The challenge here will 
be to develop an approach that balances systemic and process approaches with engaging with 
donors. The risk is that this form of systemic thinking will be incorporated in to the technocratic 
14 
 
donor approaches and consists of a small box that can be ticked to show that ‘we have done this’, 
much like ‘theory of change’. 
What then can are the core concerns that a second generation of SSR will have to address? This 
article proposes three groups of concerns: institutions and institutional power; developing processes 
rather than structures; and engagement with hidden politics. 
Firstly, institutions remain important. In the contemporary world, systems of domination and power 
remain and they are overwhelmingly states, even if their reach may be limited in some places. States 
require institutional structures to exist, although these may not all be exactly the same. Security 
institutions, for example, are critical to the maintenance of secure populations and all states have 
variations on militaries and/or police. Professionalism within these services remains critical, 
otherwise they can become the chief threat to populations rather than the chief protector and, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, professional training is disproportionately covered in the literature. What is 
lacking here is the consideration of how those institutions relate to political frameworks. In other 
words, how far are militaries and police controlled within civil legislation and political frameworks, 
but also how far are they related to the infrapolitics of ethnicity, corruption, kinship, personal rule or 
regional bias? It is clear from previous studies of SSR, that one of the core issues with programmes 
so far has been an emphasis on those targets that are relatively easily achieved over those that are 
more complex. A detailed study of Sierra Leone from 1997 to 2014 showed that whilst the technical 
capabilities of the security services had been successfully reconstructed, there remained issues that 
directly affected the lack of civil and political oversight and also the creeping politicisation of 
recruitment to the police, for example (Jackson and Albrecht, 2010; 2016: Denney, 2014). 
Institutions themselves are important, but division of powers and control of institutions remain the 
underlying crucial factor in the success or otherwise of international peacebuilding. 
The point about institutions as a problem is that previous versions of SSR have concentrated only on 
them and have created false boundaries around them, treating them as technical organisations that 
can be separated from the societies in which they exist. No institution can realistically exist outside 
the social norms of the people who are employed by that agency, but an agency can begin to 
influence the norms of those who work there and, by implication, wider norms. That is the theory 
behind finding an entry point to institutional development. Reform approaches like anti-corruption 
have been less successful where they have had their own separate institution, but more successful 
where they have been integrated in to collective action approaches (Marquette and Peiffer, 2015). 
Institutions do not have to sit atop underlying politics, but can become integrated into them as long 
as they are understood - who benefits or loses, who controls them, mechanisms for civil control over 
security services? In an intriguing reversal of the medical analogies that are frequently used, what 
SSR could think of doing is, instead of healing the patient and returning to some prior assumed state, 
to introduce a virus – of anti-corruption, say – in one part of the system and then encourage it to 
spread to the rest of the system, which is much closer to the public administration approaches of 
incrementalism, problem-driven foci and collaboration amongst stakeholders advocated by analysts 
like Andrews ( 2013). 
Secondly, taking up Lederach’s (1997) core idea of developing processes rather than building 
institutions, further provides an avenue for this viral development to enhance the further 
development of SSR and also to tackle one of its core issues of sustainability. This implies that 
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instead of starting out with a predetermined view of what a military or police force looks like and 
then working towards that, the various qualities of a desired, and agreed security service would 
emerge as a result of discussion. At the same time, there are also several relationships to be 
discussed with regard to the provision of justice and policing, not least how far local security 
providers are able to exercise authority, what offences should be subject to formal police inquiry 
and whether there is access to recourse for those seeking justice. In practice the system across much 
of the African countryside, for example, reflects this already with many more people using 
customary authorities than formal policing structures and most people facing institutional 
multiplicity at the local level. Community policing, for example, is a concept that has been adopted 
across Africa in varying forms, including in Ethiopia (Baker, 2013; Di Nunzio, 2014), Mozambique 
(Kyed, 2010), Nigeria (Hills, 2014) and Sierra Leone (Albrecht et al, 2014). However, this cannot be 
interpreted as either a wholly bottom-up or consistent initiative since much of this development has 
been undertaken by donor-led programmes reinterpreting approaches from the global North. In 
addition, the structures and processes of policing itself across Africa vary greatly, with the classic, 
Weberian bureaucratic police structures being somewhat patchy and empirical policing being 
characterised by heterogeneity of providers, opacity of the police force itself and a multiplicity of 
providers drawing on a wide range of authorities (Bierschenk, 2017). What a second generation of 
SSR requires here is precisely Lederach’s idea that external intervention should enable local people 
and societies to make their own choices within locally existing frameworks. This would, of course, 
allow a degree of choice for someone who might lose out in the traditional or customary system – 
usually a woman or youth – who would then be able to pursue justice using a different avenue. This 
implies changing a historical approach that has relied on constructing formal legal systems that are 
some distance from people both geographically and epistemologically.  
Thirdly, an engagement with hidden politics, the emphasis on process over constructing institutions 
alongside the continuing importance of institutions themselves over time, raise some very difficult 
questions for those wishing to intervene. In particular, an emphasis on process requires a total 
reconfiguration of a programming architecture that rests on finite time periods and measureable 
outputs. Non-linearity is difficult to measure, unpredictable and not necessarily time-bound, so it 
does not lend itself to programming. In addition, working within existing frameworks to develop 
processes that enhance security and justice and therefore SSR takes considerable understanding, 
effort and time. Sierra Leone, one of the most covered countries within the SSR literature, is a small 
country where clear donor leadership from the UK existed as a long-term commitment through a 
Memorandum of Understanding and a consistent provision of skills and resources. Yet after twenty 
years, there are still issues within the security sector in Sierra Leone and SSR remains an ongoing 
process (Jackson and Albrecht, 2016). This begs the question if SSR is so difficult in a small country 
like Sierra Leone, then what chance for Afghanistan, South Sudan or Syria? 
Non-linear approaches and the incorporation of hidden politics requires far more effort in terms of 
understanding the local context, most of which takes time and is frequently not done well, if at all. 
Multi-layered approaches already advocated within some of the SSR literature, recognise that this 
may vary at different levels, but the analysis of multi-layered or hybrid approaches tends to avoid 
discussions of power within those systems, hence Chandler’s (2013) assertion that some of these 
approaches establish a way of criticising linear, liberal approaches but end up reifying local solutions 
instead of recognising them as power structures in their own right. This emphasises the problem of 
lack of understanding and a lack of willingness to understand, but also a reluctance to engage with 
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actors who are not able to ‘talk the talk’. Whereas many local actors within SSR programmes to date 
have been located in the capital city, speak English or French, wear suits and can write project 
documents, many of the communities most affected everyday insecurity are located outside the 
capital cities, do not speak English and may not share international actors’ views on gender relations 
or human rights. However, these are the very people involved with the infrapolitics of what actually 
happens within states.  
Perhaps one thing that parts of the international community needs to do in further developing a 
second generation SSR, is to be humble about their own views and learn to work with those who 
might have different approaches or beliefs about the world. That does not mean merely agreeing 
and accommodating, but it means having respect for others and working in partnership to develop 
mutually beneficial developments. This can, if done sensitively, produce positive outcomes through 
consensual community policing that is actually part of the community, such as reductions in child 
brides and gender violence in rural Ethiopia (Baker, 2013). There is a key paradox when it comes to 
practical issues, which reflects a broader issue of control. As Bernshausen and Bonacker (2011) point 
out in their advocacy of constructivist approaches to security reform :  
‘We believe that if we are to adopt a systemic approach to conflict transformation, a basic 
premise is the impossibility of exercising direct control. When designing an intervention, we 
must therefore focus our efforts on creating a framework, an environment conducive to 
peace processes. We must let go of the idea of designing a detailed blueprint for conflict 
parties to follow. Nor can we ever be sure that we have considered and adequately 
anticipated the plethora of systemic factors and responses that may occur during a desired 
peace process. A more constructive and sustainable approach means embracing uncertainty 
and contradiction and concentrating on enhancing a system’s capacity for self-organization 
and resilience.’ (Bernshausen and Bonacker, 2011, 30) 
This reflection that a key issue is that even if one wished to exercise control, this is virtually 
impossible in an uncertain process, has led to discussions around new non-linear approaches 
developed within the wider public administration literature, based around ‘Thinking and Working 
Politically’ (Leftwich, 2011) and ‘Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation’ (PDIA) (Andrews et al, 2012) 
and its by-product ‘Doing Development Differently’ (DDD) which is a practical approach to PDIA. This 
set of approaches questions the overall orthodoxy of project approaches to international 
development and emphasises power dynamics, process, context, systems thinking and adaptive and 
iterative approaches to international intervention, similar to Lederach’s (1997) approach within 
peace studies. Much like this peace studies tradition, the thinking and working politically approach 
advocates a ‘learning by doing’ approach rather than setting out with a blueprint, recognising that 
there are political asymmetries at the beginning of the process and learning how to work with them, 
and recognising that there will be winners and losers in any outcome from a reform process. This 
requires different approaches from international donors engaged in activities like SSR in terms of 
taking a flexible and pragmatic approach to programming to enable responses to the changing 
political environment, but also recognising that involvement in some security services will create 
new sources of power that need to be accounted for. In many ways, one of the lessons from Sierra 
Leone that does not seem to have been learnt in subsequent programming was the presence of 
precisely such a flexible, pragmatic fund that was allowed to act as the political situation dictated 
(Jackson and Albrecht, 2016).viii 
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Conclusions: new generation, same underlying dilemmas 
The failures of previous SSR programmes are all too evident and have prompted a focus on the 
interaction between the international community and states affected by SSR programming. The 
detailed literature mapping that was the starting point for this research shows clearly that there are 
clear areas where the SSR has concentrated, particularly in institution-building, technocratic 
approaches to problems and measureable outcomes. The liberal approach to peacebuilding 
represented by this literature is characterised by a reliance on the liberal state and liberal 
approaches to development and security, not least in emphasising the development of formal state 
institutions over informal, traditional ones. At the same time, the lack of clear success in SSR has led 
to a reconsideration of approaches, not least in terms of the limitations of the liberal state and the 
incorporation of non-linear approaches to security. However, in many ways this analysis remains 
only partial, since there is little actual knowledge of hidden politics by the international community 
in practice, and in many ways much of this theoretical approach reifies the local without really 
examining the implications of incorporating traditional systems that bring their own politics and 
power structures with them. In identifying hidden politics with ‘resistance’, for example, this places 
local political structures in a heroic opposition to the international order, whereas in reality those 
local structures and the actual hidden politics of states are far more complex, inter-related and non-
dualistic between the international and the local. It also fails to recognise that local politics has its 
own hierarchies and power structures that may be less than heroic in terms of resistance to liberal 
values. 
The development of non-linear approaches to SSR can be seen as a way of incorporating traditional 
structures in to a broader global security system. In other words, non-linear approaches to SSR 
represent more than an attempt to resolve issues of difference specific to a context in which the 
liberal peace experiences real difficulty. At the same time it is a means through which the other can 
be assimilated in to liberal strategies and by implication the liberal world system, thereby 
overcoming something that is perceived as an obstacle or spoiler in a wider process of 
modernisation. This may be a way of using non-linear SSR as a problem solving tool to expand the 
biopolitical reach of liberal statebuilding, but in many ways it also represents a ‘back to the future’ 
approach of reflecting earlier, colonial approaches of indirect rule and incorporation of local polities 
(and invented ones) in to a global security order dominated by international empires. A second 
generation SSR approach needs to go beyond this impasse and take on three groups of issues: 
recognition of institutions are important, but not necessarily the institutions that have been 
supported in the past or supported in isolation from infrapolitics; developing processes that are 
inclusive and may be sustainable in the medium to long-term; and engagement with the hidden 
politics of states, recognising that they are not blank slates and institutions of the state do not exist 
in a political vacuum.  
The reality is that a multiplicity of institutions, overlapping political networks and hidden politics that 
are not actually ‘hidden’ at all, just not recognised or known by international analysts, comprise an 
evolving political process of contestation over power and resources. These social forces can exist and 
transcend different levels of formal politics ranging from the international to the community and 
also incorporate agents that are able to navigate these different levels, or between formal and 
informal politics, or be instrumental in forming and reforming alliances. The outcomes of these 
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alliances and agencies lead to uneven results from international activities at least partly because 
those interventions fail to understand how to locate themselves within these networks. Any 
development of second generation SSR must pay more than lip service to political networks and 
recognise that processes that may lead to improvements in security rely on processes as much as 
institutions. 
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Notes 
                                                          
i
  
ii
  
iii
 The author was an adviser to the research process and worked with the lead researcher for the study. 
iv
 Identified as part of the initial brief for the study by DFID. 
v
 DFID uses the title ‘theory of change’ to denote activities that may lead to a change in circumstances for the 
target population. This is widely used within DFID but is also extremely imprecise. A very good review of the 
use of this terminology concluded that ‘…we find that there is no consensus on how to define ToC, although it 
is commonly understood as an articulation of how and why a given intervention will lead to specific change.’ 
(Stein and Valters, 2012, 2). In addition this review actually changed their focus to ‘ToC approaches’ to reflect 
the confusion over terminology, the wide range of activities and the lack of a core definition. It should also be 
noted that this is not a specific DFID activity and these types of activity are widely deployed amongst 
development agencies.  
vi
 This might be attributed to an academic, and practitioner, bias towards quantitative methods to provide ‘hard 
evidence’, but is not necessarily specific to SSR. 
vii
 There is an extensive critical literature in this area, but see Duffield, 2001; MacGinty and Richmond, 2013; 
Pospisil & Kühn, 2016 amongst others. 
viii
 This fund, the Sierra Leone Security Sector Project (SILSEP) was established in 1999 and operated over 
multiple years and acted as an umbrella project over the SSR process (see Jackson and Albrecht, 2016) 
 
 
